

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF AN ATTRIPTED GOUP IN ALBANIA


ADVANTAGES

- 1. If successful, would,
 - a. Cause world-wide loss of USER prestige.
- b. Cause slight improvement in Western Military position in Balkans, with corresponding loss to Soviets (involving primarily Sasan (Sasono) Island naval base at mouth of Adriatic).
- o. Provide an additional base for clandestine operations into Yugoslavia and Greece.
- d. Demonstrate to vacillating and neutral nations that West is capable of offensive action in cold war and imply that further offensives will be forthcoming.
- e. Raise morale amongst satellite peoples, strengthen will to resist Communism, and increase cooperation with Wostern covert services.
 - f. Intimidate satellite government officials.
- g. With proper PP exploitation, re-emphasise to populations of non-Iron Curtain countries the pupper nature of satellite governments and the overwhelming anti-Communist convictions of satellite populations thus strengthening popular Western registance to Communist blandishments.
- h. If sponsored by US-UK or US-UK-Yugoslav, would avoid possible future Balcan conflict or wrangling resulting from unilateral Yugoslav-inspired coup and avoid probable loss of U.S. prestige resulting from failure to capitalize on covert investment in Albania.
- i. Allow diversion to other projects of funds now allocated to BGFIEND.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3 B 2 B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007

86592

60.1.5





2. Whether successful or not, would:

a. Wrest initiative from Soviets and force them to operate in a theater presumably not of their own choosing.

b. Possibly serve as an operational test to determine true nature of Tito-Soviet relations.

c. Divert Soviet attention from more strategic areas.

d. Provide all U.S. agencies engaged in coup with valuable experience in conducting operation to overthrow a satellite government.

DI SADVANTAGES

1. Probably provoke retaliatory Soviet aggression elsewhere (e.g., Berlin, Iran, Indo-China).

2. Possible risk of starting World War III imadvertently, by placing USSR in position she feels she cannot accept.

5. Severe propaganda defeat if coup unsuccessful, particularly if West identified as backers.

4. Loss of confidence in U.S. leadership by European allies if known, suspected or intimated that U.S. had a hand in upsetting precarious peace in Balkans - particularly if coup is unsuccessful.

5. Risk of provoking local Balkan war between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (only country with which Albania has mutual assistance pact).

6. Propaganda amumition provided USSR if Regoslavia dominates now Albanian government.

7. Risk, after successful coup, of subsequently losing Albania to Soviets if Yugoslavia returns to Cominform, resulting in loss of prestige to U.S.

8. Economic drain on West, after liberation, and small economic gain to USER.

9. Probably intensify Russia's war preparations.

10. Probably intensify Russia's psychological warfare campaign.

86532